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Management scholars have identified a variety of firm characteristics as antecedents to organi-
zational learning. In this study, we conceptualize intraorganizational multiplicity of mental 
models as a complementary element that facilitates shifting from lower- to higher-level learning. 
Specifically, we investigate whether multiplicity of mental models—proxied by four measures—
helps acquirers to categorically adapt selection rules for legal advisors in mergers and acquisi-
tions (M&As) from domestic toward international settings. In developing our conceptual 
framework, we integrate resource-based, social network, and organizational learning perspec-
tives. Empirically, we draw on 11,511 acquisition attempts announced from 1998 to 2010 
(completion/abandonment assessed as of January 10, 2015, at the latest). The results largely 
support our theory: First, choosing legal advisors in domestic and international deals calls for 
different selection rules. While in domestic deals, network-related characteristics are more 
important drivers of lawyers’ performance relative to their country-specific expertise, the 
Acknowledgments: This article was accepted under the editorship of Patrick M. Wright. We thank associate editor 
William P. Wan and two anonymous reviewers for their excellent comments and guidance in improving the article. 
We also thank seminar audiences at the AOM 2013, AIB 2013, and WK ORG 2015 conferences for useful comments 
on earlier drafts. We particularly thank Joanna Barth and Anja Loderer for valuable research assistance in terms 
of data collection. Any remaining errors are our own.
Supplemental material for this article is available with the manuscript on the JOM website.
Corresponding author: Katrin Muehlfeld, Trier University, Universitätsring 15, Trier, 54286 Germany. 
E-mail: muehlfeld@uni-trier.de
753292 JOMXXX10.1177/0149206317753292Journal of ManagementWestbrock et al. / Selecting Legal Advisors in M&As
research-article2018
2194  Journal of Management / May 2019
comparative relevance of these attributes is reversed in cross-border deals. Yet, initially, acquir-
ers fail to recognize this. Also, they do not initially adjust their selection criteria appropriately 
in response to accumulating M&A experience of their own. Only after having attempted a sub-
stantial number of cross-border M&As, they reach a turning point at which they rebalance their 
selection criteria such that they reflect the predominant relevance of country expertise in cross-
border settings. Finally, recognition of the need to categorically reassess selection criteria in inter-
national deals is significantly facilitated by an acquirer’s multiplicity of mental models.
Keywords: organizational learning; experiential learning; social networks; legal advisors; 
cross-border vs. domestic M&As; acquisition completion
Some organizations appear to be systematically better at learning than others (Argote, 
2012). What sets them apart? Argote and Miron-Spektor (2011) conceptualized the organiza-
tional context as being composed of various elements whose interplay affects an organiza-
tion’s ability to learn. Prior research empirically identified several contextual antecedents of 
organizational learning, such as organizational scope (specialist vs. generalist), culture, 
absorptive capacity, aspiration level, intra- and interorganizational network relations, infor-
mation technology and knowledge management systems, and, for intraorganizational group 
learning processes, lower-level constructs (e.g., team member diversity; Argote, 2012).
Here, we propose intraorganizational multiplicity of mental models—defined as a count 
of distinct mental models relating to a specific information domain within the organization—
as a complementary contextual element that may foster specific types of organizational 
learning. Our arguments differ from prior research in that we propose that the impact of 
multiplicity of mental models is less domain specific than the influence of related constructs, 
such as absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). We suggest that it allows for “meta-
contextual” learning—that is, learning in and across various and even otherwise unrelated 
domains. In the context of organizational learning, mental models have been characterized as 
“deeply held internal images of how the world works” (Senge, 1990: 163). Greater multiplic-
ity of mental models within the organization first makes available a larger range of cognitive 
structures for describing and dealing with a specific type of task (e.g., sourcing advisory 
services). Second, we propose that multiplicity of mental models facilitates the emergence of 
a generalized awareness of the existence of a range of cognitive structures independent of the 
specific task. We maintain that, by highlighting the possibility of “doing things differently” 
in general, multiplicity may facilitate a specific type of learning in response to accumulating 
experience—that is, recognition of the need to shift from lower-level learning, which entails 
adaptation within a given set of rules, to higher-level learning, which entails changing under-
lying rules (cf. Fiol & Lyles, 1985).
In this article, we seek to address whether an organization’s multiplicity of mental models 
positively affects recognition of the need to shift to higher-level learning. We address this 
issue in the context of a specific research setting: Acquirers’ selection of legal advisors in 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) constitutes the object of learning in this study. Given that 
the relevance of different types of advisors varies across the M&A process, we zoom in on a 
specific stage during which legal advisors are of particular importance: the public takeover 
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phase (Karsten, Malmendier, & Sautner, 2014; Krishnan & Masulis, 2013). We study whether 
acquirers apply the selection rules that they developed in domestic M&As to international 
deals: On one hand, institutional differences across countries (e.g., Dikova, Rao Sahib, & van 
Witteloostuijn, 2010) create strong pressures to reassess established routines, especially as 
related to the role of country-specific legal expertise. On the other, the credence good nature 
of legal services (Coates, 2001) and the potential “dark side” of embeddedness (e.g., Lee, 
2013) of acquirers’ network relations with lawyers counteract these pressures.
Following research on partner selection (e.g., Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Hitt, Dacin, 
Levitas, Arregle, & Borza, 2000; Lee, 2013), we blend resource-based, social network, and 
organizational learning perspectives in deriving our hypotheses. First, we analyze acquirers’ 
reliance in domestic deals on relational vis-à-vis expertise-related law firm attributes for 
advisor selection and consider their contributions to advisor performance. Second, we inves-
tigate whether the same criteria govern advisors’ performance in international M&As and 
whether acquirers employ them as a basis for selection. Our basic expectation is that bidders 
need to nominate advisors on the basis of a reversed weighting of relational and expertise-
related attributes when they operate internationally but that they do not recognize this ini-
tially. Next, we study the effect of experiential learning: When accumulating international 
M&A experience, do acquirers learn to fundamentally rebalance the selection criteria to bet-
ter align them with the drivers of law firm performance in international deals? Following 
Haleblian and Finkelstein’s (1999) theory of inappropriate generalization, we expect that 
they will initially fail to do so but that sufficient experience will facilitate the shift from 
lower- to higher-level learning needed for a categorical rebalancing of selection criteria. Last, 
we ask whether firms with greater multiplicity of mental models require less experience to 
reach this turning point.
An analysis of 5,594 domestic and 5,917 cross-border M&A attempts announced from 
1998 to 2010 supports our theory. First, selecting legal advisors calls for distinct weighting 
of network-related relative to expertise-related attributes in domestic and international deals. 
Second, acquirers learn from experience: There exists a turning point beyond which the typi-
cal bidder relies more on expertise- rather than network-related selection criteria in cross-
border deals. Third, multiplicity of mental models—assessed at various organizational levels 
and in several domains—appears to facilitate the required shift from lower- to higher-level 
learning. In sum, this study provides important insights regarding organizational learning, 
social networks, and M&As and for managerial practice.
Research Setting: Role of Legal Advisors in Completing M&As
M&A processes consist of two broad stages: precompletion, which ends with the official 
resolution, and integration (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). Two critical events mark the 
precompletion phase (Boone & Mulherin, 2007): The private takeover period starts with the 
initial screening of potential business combinations, and it ends with the official announce-
ment of a preliminary merger agreement. The ensuing public takeover phase starts with this 
announcement and ends with either completion or abandonment. While a legal advisor 
might be involved in drafting the preliminary agreement, the primary duty of the counsel 
begins after this agreement is signed and the deal is announced (DePamphilis, 2008). The 
counsel is then responsible for (a) obtaining shareholder, regulatory, and third-party consent 
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and (b) structuring, drafting, and completing the definitive agreement of purchase and sale 
in a way that accommodates the diverse interests and complies with all relevant regulations 
of every country where acquirer and target are listed or incorporated (Gilson & Black, 
1996). Lawyers advise clients on responsibilities in making or responding to offers; act as 
principal negotiators for legal terms; provide legal due diligence; draft contracts; ensure that 
corporation, antitrust, securities, and tax laws are being followed; and are responsible for 
M&A-related litigation (Krishnan & Masulis, 2013). How can their performance during the 
public takeover phase be assessed?
While the release of new information may always prompt the necessity to reassess a deal 
(Chakrabarti & Mitchell, 2016; Zhou, Xie, & Wang, 2016), prior literature argued that, dur-
ing this public takeover stage, completion and particularly closing time (i.e., the time that it 
takes to proceed from the initial public announcement to the definitive agreement) constitute 
important outcome variables from the viewpoint of acquirers (Chakrabarti & Mitchell, 2016; 
Dikova et al., 2010; Karsten et al., 2014).1 Especially at this stage, the involved parties need 
to resolve issues of legal nature to swiftly complete an announced M&A. M&As are complex 
legal transactions because of the large number of stakeholder groups that are involved, 
including managers, shareholders, banks, employees, and regulatory authorities (Boone & 
Mulherin, 2007; DePamphilis, 2008). Against this background, legal counsel is a “transac-
tion cost engineer” (Gilson, 1984: 244) that has a major impact on the likelihood that an 
agreement is reached and particularly on the time that it takes to close a deal (Gilson & 
Black, 1996; Karsten et al., 2014; Krishnan & Masulis, 2013). Hence, a lawyer’s contribution 
to reducing closing time can be viewed as a key indicator of his or her performance.
Theory and Hypotheses
Acquirers’ Selection of Legal Advisors and Law Firm Performance in 
Domestic M&As
How do acquirers select lawyers for the public takeover phase, and what drives advisors’ 
performance? Little direct evidence exists, but research on partner selection (e.g., Hitt et al., 
2000), including alliances (e.g., Chung, Singh, & Lee, 2000; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999), sug-
gests at least two categories of selection criteria, which may also affect performance: first, 
social network relations; second, access to complementary resources and capabilities.
Social network relations. The literature on partner selection in interorganizational net-
works (e.g., Gulati, 1995; Mitsuhashi & Min, 2016) and on social networks in professional 
services (e.g., Baum, Rowley, Shipilov, & Chuang, 2005; Jensen, 2003) identified network-
related attributes—also referred to as embeddedness—such as past direct ties between organi-
zations as strong predictors of selection in future exchange episodes. Social networks provide 
unique mechanisms for the governance of transactions and the dissemination of information 
(W. W. Powell & Smith-Doerr, 1994). Ties from repeat interactions between the same actors 
enable mutual learning, motivate the sharing of private information, and reduce the potential 
for frictions in subsequent episodes (Uzzi & Lancaster, 2004).
Studies on network relations of professional service firms (e.g., Baker, 1990; Uzzi & 
Lancaster, 2004) suggest that past direct ties between clients and advisors not only matter 
for selection but may also affect outcome variables—as would be expected from a rational 
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capability-based logic of partner selection. How may network relations between acquirer 
and lawyer enable legal counsel to perform better during the public takeover phase? Past 
interactions can help in various ways: First, they enable direct learning about the partner’s 
corporate culture and internal procedures. Familiarity with the bidder’s ways of working 
during the public takeover stage—with its intraorganizational routines, organizational struc-
ture, and decision-making bodies (formal and informal)—facilitates coordination between 
lawyer and client regarding the design of the acquisition contract (Karsten et al., 2014) and, 
generally, the structuring of the diverse interests and compliance with all relevant regula-
tions. Second, past ties facilitate the emergence of trust (Gulati, 1995; Uzzi & Lancaster, 
2004), especially if accompanied by a degree of closeness and exclusivity in the relationship 
(Coleman, 1990; Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000) that goes beyond mere familiarity. Trust stimu-
lates relationship-specific investments—for example, in terms of interorganizational rou-
tines in jointly handling legal issues during the public takeover stage. It may also stimulate 
sharing of private information (Gulati, 1995; Uzzi & Lancaster, 2004) about the motives of 
and intentions for a merger. Such information, in turn, enables the lawyer to better anticipate 
the acquirer’s concerns during negotiations, thereby speeding up internal discussions 
between bidder and advisor and thus also the process of exchanging markups between the 
parties (Karsten et al., 2014).
Country-specific expertise. Firms tend to team up with other firms that possess comple-
mentary resources or capabilities (e.g., Chung et al., 2000; Mitsuhashi & Min, 2016; Shah 
& Swaminathan, 2008). While much research focused on horizontal alliances, the argument 
likely extends to acquirers’ relationships with legal advisors. Given the complexity of M&As, 
which touch on many areas of law (Gilson & Black, 1996), and their relative rarity as corpo-
rate events, most companies find it inefficient to rely strongly on in-house counsel. Instead, 
they seek the expertise of law firms specializing in M&As (e.g., Heinz, Nelson, & Laumann, 
2001). A range of legal domains is relevant in mergers, and countries differ significantly in 
these respects. Also, given the dispersed and highly regulated nature of the international legal 
service industry (e.g., Faulconbridge & Muzio, 2016), law firms’ M&A expertise is often 
country specific: Local experts are typically regional or even local players, suggesting target 
country–specific expertise as a key selection criterion.
Here, the mechanisms that enable a country expert to shorten closing time are especially 
relevant. First, familiarity with the legal and regulatory framework of a focal country implies 
the ability to efficiently ensure compliance with all its relevant regulations (Gilson & Black, 
1996). Second, routines to apply efficient information verification techniques, which may 
vary by country, allow for expediting legal due diligence, because familiarity with the con-
text facilitates interpretation and assessment of whether and what additional information 
needs to be collected from local information providers. Third, as suggested by studies on 
cultural influences on negotiations, dealings with the seller and its legal counsel are likely to 
be influenced by country context (e.g., Adair & Brett, 2005). Having routines in place to 
carry out these negotiations should reduce completion time. Fourth, established relationships 
with local authorities are an important form of social capital. They facilitate interpretation 
and appraisal of regulatory requirements and preparation of necessary documents, thereby 
reducing the time that the deal is being reviewed by the authorities. Overall, a law firm’s 
country-specific legal expertise likely allows it to engage more effectively in “engineering” 
a deal. Studies in financial economics indeed showed how bidders may benefit from hiring 
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lawyers with superior general and, to some extent, country-specific expertise during the final 
phases of M&As, especially in terms of quicker closing (Karsten et al., 2014; Krishnan & 
Masulis, 2013).
Which of these lawyer characteristics—network relations or country-specific expertise—
is more important for an acquirer’s selection of a legal counsel, and which is a better predic-
tor of the counsel’s performance? For domestic M&As, we suggest that country-specific 
expertise is less important in both respects: Acquirers generally face difficulties in assessing 
the quality of an unknown lawyer, ex ante and ex post (Coates, 2001). Heterogeneity among 
domestic law firms, in terms of their country-specific expertise in the domestic context, is by 
definition limited. In addition, acquirers are themselves familiar with the basic tenets of the 
legal framework governing business operations in their home countries. Therefore, we expect 
acquirers to rely on their trusted counsel, as they stand to gain little from appointing an unfa-
miliar one, and this choice will be in line with the drivers of lawyers’ performance. Overall, 
we expect the following:
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): In domestic M&As, network- and expertise-related attributes of a law firm are 
positively associated with the likelihood of being selected as counsel, but acquirers place rela-
tively more weight on network-related criteria.
Hypothesis 1b (H1b): In domestic M&As, network- and expertise-related attributes of a law firm are 
positively associated with its performance in terms of shorter closing time, but network-related 
criteria have a relatively stronger impact on performance.
Acquirers’ Selection of Legal Advisors and Law Firm Performance in 
International M&As
Selection. Do bidders transfer domestic advisor selection routines to the international 
domain? Prior research offers contrary perspectives. Some scholars argued that acquirers in 
international deals are acutely aware of their unfamiliarity with the deal context, including 
the institutional environment (e.g., Barkema & Schijven, 2008; Muehlfeld, Rao Sahib, & van 
Witteloostuijn, 2012), suggesting an increased sensitivity to the need to adapt.
Yet, collecting information about competencies and reliability of another firm is costly 
and time-consuming (e.g., Stinchcombe, 1990). For legal services, this challenge is aggra-
vated by the fact that “legal advice often involves questions of judgment under conditions of 
uncertainty that will persist even after a trial or negotiation or other legal event is completed” 
(Coates, 2001: 1301). Hence, as acquirers face difficulties in assessing the quality of an 
unknown (host country) lawyer vis-à-vis the proven qualities of a known advisor, they may 
transfer the network-heavy weighting of selection criteria from the domestic to the interna-
tional domain. Research on social networks supports this view, pointing to “embeddedness 
as a solution to relational hazards in market exchanges” (Lee, 2013: 1238). In the very situa-
tions that require specific expertise to handle a complex task with uncertain outcomes, actors 
often resort to what they perceive as the least risky option: their well-known trusted partners 
(Lee, 2013; Mizruchi & Stearns, 2001). This is not to say that acquirers necessarily select 
their counsel based on irrational motives. Rather, the uncertainty they face in the nomination 
decision, combined with the complexity and uncertainty of the cross-border deal itself, may 
make them highly risk averse, “nudging” them away from the local expert and toward the 
familiar counsel: “When trustworthy partners are already available, searching for strangers is 
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hard to be rationalized” (Chung et al., 2000: 5). Indeed, Howard, Withers, Carnes, and 
Hillman (2016) found that greater firm-level uncertainty led firms to reinforce alliance ties 
rather than engage in a broadening of ties—thus,
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): In cross-border M&As, network- and expertise-related attributes of a law firm 
are positively associated with the likelihood of being selected as counsel, but the typical acquirer 
places relatively more weight on network-related criteria.
Performance. How could target country–specific expertise reduce closing time? Essen-
tially, we expect the same mechanisms to apply as proposed earlier: familiarity with the legal 
framework, routines for information verification and legal due diligence, familiarity with 
culture-specific negotiation styles and customs, established relationships with authorities. 
However, acquirers are up against greater challenges in attempting to complete international 
deals as opposed to domestic M&As due to, among other factors, the national differences in 
terms of formal and informal institutions (Dikova et al., 2010; Weitzel & Berns, 2006), such 
as nation-specific legal and tax systems and accounting practices (Very & Schweiger, 2001). 
This complication especially affects legal issues during the closing phase. Not only does 
the legal service industry feature a high degree of national embeddedness (Faulconbridge 
& Muzio, 2016), but legal advisors additionally face the task of ensuring legal compliance 
in a highly fragmented environment with increasingly complex national takeover regula-
tions (White & Case, 2009). Thus, the provision of legal services in M&As has only limited 
potential for developing any generalized expertise (cf. Karsten et al., 2014). In addition, the 
limitations to transferability of local expertise are exacerbated by the fact that many countries 
have installed widespread impediments to the entry of foreign lawyers. Hence, a lawyer’s 
local expertise in a core country of its operations constitutes a key asset in advising deals that 
involve said country. In sum, we expect that a law firm’s target country–specific expertise 
allows it to engage more effectively in “engineering” a deal, including quicker legal due dili-
gence, reduced time for drafting and revising the contract and any markups, more efficient 
negotiations with the counterparty, and shorter time under which authorities review the deal. 
Given the eminent role of legal contingencies during the public stage, we further maintain 
that in cross-border deals, target country expertise is even more significant for advisor per-
formance than a trustful relationship and reduced relational frictions between bidder and 
advisor. Overall, we expect that the relative importance of network- and expertise-related 
attributes is reversed when compared with domestic deals:
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): In cross-border M&As, network- and expertise-related attributes of a law firm 
are positively associated with its performance in terms of shorter closing time, but expertise-
related criteria have a relatively stronger impact on performance.
In sum, while H1a to H2a fit into an, at least boundedly, rational capability-based logic of 
partner selection, H2b breaks this logic: In cross-border deals, acquirers continue to rely on 
their long-term partners, with ties initially established in domestic settings, but these embed-
ded lawyers are unlikely to be experts in the specific host country environment and vice versa 
(cf. Mitsuhashi & Min, 2016). Social network research provides a possible rationale for such 
a discrepancy between drivers of selection and drivers of law firms’ performance in cross-
border M&As: Acquirers may favor familiar choices over the most capable ones because 
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they fall prey to a behavioral bias arising from a dark side of embeddedness (e.g., Lee, 2013). 
Can experience eliminate this discrepancy by stimulating learning? If so, could multiplicity 
of mental models within the acquirer firm facilitate this learning process?
Types of Organizational Learning and Selection of Legal Advisors in 
International M&As
Organizational learning refers to an experience-driven change in an organization’s knowl-
edge, which includes declarative and procedural knowledge—that is, facts as well as skills 
and routines, thus comprising cognitive and behavioral elements (e.g., Argote, 2012; Fiol & 
Lyles, 1985). Routines represent collective, repetitive, and fairly stable patterns (Nelson & 
Winter, 1982) that may relate to operational, administrative, and strategic activities, such as 
procedures to select advisory services in M&As. By performing a task, an organization accu-
mulates experience, giving rise to learning.
Yet, there is more than one kind of learning. Different kinds of learning appear to coexist 
in organizations (e.g., Miller, 1996), and most scholars agree on the existence of at least two 
types of qualitatively distinct learning (cf. Tosey, Visser, & Saunders, 2012). Tosey et al. 
(2012) identified the following as the most common labels to capture this dichotomy: lower- 
and higher-level learning (Fiol & Lyles, 1985), single- and double-loop learning (Argyris & 
Schön, 1978), exploitation and exploration (Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991), incre-
mental and radical (Miner & Mezias, 1996), and adaptive and generative (Senge, 1990). 
They further suggest that a “consensus seems to have been established that they refer to 
comparable learning processes and outcomes” (p. 292). Here, we use the terms lower- and 
higher-level learning. Lower-level learning occurs within a given set of rules, norms, and 
frameworks; it is based on existing routines; it maintains the core features of the relevant 
“theory in use”; and it restricts “itself to detecting and correcting errors within that given 
system of rules” (Fiol & Lyles, 1985: 808; referring to Argyris & Schön, 1978). Higher-level 
learning implies changing underlying rules, norms, and frameworks, and it aims at develop-
ing “new cognitive frameworks within which to make decisions” (Fiol & Lyles, 1985: 808). 
It requires “unlearning” of conceived knowledge and reorientation of cognitive structures 
(Nystrom & Starbuck, 1984).
Acquirers’ Adaptation of Selection Criteria from Domestic to  
International Settings
In our research setting, we characterize lower-level learning as attempts to improve the 
selection of legal counsels in cross-border M&As without questioning the basic selection 
rules—for example, by adapting the weights attached to the two kinds of selection criteria 
transferred from the domestic context but without categorically changing the predominant 
importance of network-related attributes. Though, on the basis of H1 and H2, we argue that 
acquirers ultimately need to recognize that the relative significance of network- vis-à-vis exper-
tise-related attributes is reversed in cross-border M&As. This requires a switch from lower- to 
higher-level learning.2 Are acquirers able to use their M&A experience to achieve this shift?
The value of experience for performance-enhancing learning crucially depends on the 
extent to which it applies to a future activity (March, 1991); that is, its transferability is 
bound by its context specificity. Prior studies emphasized the limits of such transferability 
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and, thus, the generalizability of prior experience (e.g., Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). 
Discriminating between appropriate and inappropriate generalization appears to be difficult 
in complex corporate domains due to, among other contributors, causal ambiguity (Argote, 
2012). Firms may need to accumulate a lot of experience before performance improves, and 
more experience may even initially reduce performance because of inappropriate generaliza-
tion (e.g., Duysters, Heimeriks, Lokshin, Meijer, & Sabidussi, 2012; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 
1999). Individuals as well as organizations tend to suffer from resistance to adaptation owing 
to, for example, cognitive biases (e.g., Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988) and greater uncer-
tainty of exploring new alternatives vis-à-vis refining existing ones (March, 1991). When the 
required learning entails a shift from a lower to higher level, it is likely to be challenging, as 
it requires “distant search,” whereas the initial response to unsatisfactory outcomes tends to 
involve “local search” (Cyert & March, 1963), which may result in further suboptimal out-
comes (Barkema & Schijven, 2008).
When acquirers gain experience with selecting advisors, the repeated experience of prior 
knowledge (about selection criteria) conflicting with to-be-learned information (antecedents to 
advisor performance in cross-border deals) may give rise to the gradual emergence of novel 
alternative cognitive structures for how to select the most suitable legal advisor for a particular 
type of deal—domestic or cross-border. Yet, it may take many M&As to achieve this. Thus, we 
expect that acquirers’ initial learning will result, if anything, in greater weight of past ties as a 
selection criterion, relative to (target) country expertise and that acquirers need to accumulate a 
lot of experience before adequately appreciating a law firm’s (target) country expertise. The 
turning point marks, as we argue, the sketched shift in selection routines.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): With growing cross-border M&A experience, acquirers first attach more relative 
weight to network-related criteria and, after a turning point, increasingly attach less weight to 
network-related criteria relative to expertise-related criteria.
Impact of Intraorganizational Multiplicity of Mental Models
Prior research identified three major types of moderators in the relationship between 
experience and learning outcomes (Argote, 2012): types of experience (e.g., direct vs. 
indirect), attributes of the learning process (e.g., its mindfulness), and elements of the 
organizational context (e.g., organizational culture). Adding to the third domain, we pro-
pose that structural attributes of organizational cognition—specifically, multiplicity of 
mental models—may foster a specific aspect of organizational learning based on the 
accumulation of experience: the ability to recognize the need to shift from lower- to 
higher-level learning.
Mental models were initially conceptualized at the individual level. Rouse and Morris 
(1986: 360) characterized a mental model as a “mechanism whereby humans generate 
descriptions of system purpose and form, explanations of system functioning and observed 
system states, and predictions of future system states.” As such, mental models represent 
“organized knowledge frameworks that allow individuals to describe, explain, and predict 
behavior” (Lim & Klein, 2006: 404). Senge (1990: 163) characterized them as “images 
that limit us to familiar ways of thinking and acting.” Similar to other related concepts 
(e.g., cognitive map; for a review, see Walsh, 1995), a mental model constitutes a form of 
knowledge structure or schema—a fundamental top-down information-processing 
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construct, characterized by Walsh (1995: 281) as a “mental template that individuals 
impose on an information environment to give it form and meaning.” Scholars subse-
quently transferred the knowledge structure construct to more aggregate levels and, through 
a variety of labels, discussed the existence of supraindividual knowledge structures at the 
team/group, organization, and even industry levels of analysis (cf. Walsh, 1995, for a 
review). For example, in the context of product diversification, Prahalad and Bettis (1986: 
485, 491) characterized dominant logic as a “mind set or worldview or conceptualization 
of the business and the administrative tools . . . stored as a shared cognitive map,” which 
“consists of the mental maps developed through experience in the core business.” On the 
basis of these studies, we define mental models at the level of groups within the organiza-
tion, as collective organized knowledge frameworks that allow for describing, explaining, 
and predicting behavior related to a specific information domain. For example, we expect 
business units operating in different product markets to be guided by such a collective 
knowledge framework, which allows each unit to describe, explain, and predict behavior 
in its sector as related to, for instance, industry conduct.3
It follows from the characterization of mental models as organized knowledge frame-
works that they have content and structure (Walsh, 1995). Attributes relating to both these 
dimensions are thought to affect the consequences of these knowledge structures in guid-
ing future behavior. In terms of content, for example, knowledge structures that represent 
an information environment build on experience in this domain, and the context in which 
this experience was gained constitutes an important boundary condition (e.g., Kaplan, 
2008; Walsh, 1995). The emergence of knowledge structures appears to entail reflection 
on and interpretation of this experience, including the development of perceptional filters 
that affect subsequent information acquisition and processing (e.g., Simons & Chabris, 
1999). Here, we focus solely on structure, though, and unlike most prior studies con-
cerned with structural attributes, we consider the structure of a whole set of mental mod-
els rather than the structure of an individual schema. Prior research on schema structure 
analyzed differentiation (i.e., the number of a knowledge structure’s internal dimensions) 
and integration (i.e., the extent of interconnectedness of these dimensions; see Walsh, 
1995, for a review). Using the term multiplicity, we consider differentiation at the level of 
a set of knowledge structures (e.g., the number of group-level mental models associated 
with the product markets served by an organization), a structural attribute known as rich-
ness in organizational ecology (e.g., Boone, Wezel, & van Witteloostuijn, 2013). Richness 
captures a pure count of the number of distinct types in a population or system. Accordingly, 
multiplicity of mental models refers to a count of the number of distinct mental models 
relating to a given information domain within an organization. Thereby, our definition of 
multiplicity is related to and yet distinct from diversity as commonly conceptualized in 
management research (see Harrison & Klein, 2007, for a review). Harrison and Klein 
(2007) outlined three major ways in which the diversity construct is being used—that is, 
diversity as separation, disparity, and variety. The last is closest to our definition of mul-
tiplicity. Yet, diversity as variety typically takes into account richness and abundance or 
relative distribution of these types (i.e., the proportion of unit members who belong to a 
particular type). Thus, multiplicity is a simpler concept, without specific assumptions on 
more complex distributional characteristics.
In terms of influencing an acquirer’s ability to shift from lower- to higher-level learn-
ing, we argue that multiplicity of mental models leverages the organization-level “ability 
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to reflect on, understand, and control” (Schraw & Dennison, 1994: 460) the entity’s learn-
ing, especially by facilitating the formulation of strategies for considering alternative 
cognitive mechanisms and for deliberately selecting, from a set of available mechanisms, 
those to apply in a specific situation (Flavell, 1987). Thus, we propose that multiplicity 
enables firms to better utilize their (domain-specific) experience as input for their learn-
ing by facilitating more accurate reflection on the generalizability of this experience: 
First, multiplicity of mental models relating to a certain domain may have task- or domain-
specific effects—akin to potentially positive effects from diversity of experience (e.g., 
Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002; Nadolska & Barkema, 2014)—by making available a range 
of cognitive structures for describing and dealing with a specific type of task (e.g., select-
ing lawyers). By allowing for consideration of a larger range of perspectives, qualitatively 
better decisions may become possible (e.g., Bell, Villado, Lukasik, Belau, & Briggs, 
2011; Dahlin, Weingart, & Hinds, 2005), with positive effects of heterogeneity potentially 
resulting from superior information processing related to range, depth, and integration of 
information use.
Second, resting on our conceptualization of multiplicity of mental models as a content-
independent structural attribute, we propose that it may additionally stimulate a general-
ized awareness effect independent of the specific task or domain. Each mental model rests 
on a set of assumptions, rules, and norms. Greater multiplicity of mental models illustrates 
the possibility to view the world through a larger number of sets of rules. By raising aware-
ness of the existence of many distinct worldviews, such multiplicity may facilitate a spe-
cific aspect of organizational learning—that is, recognition of the need to switch from 
lower- to higher-level learning that implies changing the underlying rules. Thereby, multi-
plicity of mental models could allow for more accurate reflection on the categorization, 
transferability, and generalizability of experience—processes that are fraught with diffi-
culties, as prior studies emphasized (e.g., Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). Based on the 
assumption that the coexistence of a multitude of worldviews in a domain is widely known 
throughout the organization, acquirers with greater multiplicity of mental models should 
thus require less experience to move from lower- to higher-level learning. Hence, our argu-
ments about this generalized effect imply that we expect the beneficial effects of multiplic-
ity to apply beyond a specific task, ranging from closely related domains to fairly distant 
and even unrelated ones (for a similar argument, see K. S. Powell & Rhee, 2016). What 
matters are not actual similarities between two tasks but demonstration of the—at least 
hypothetical—possibility to “do things differently.” Thus, while experience represents a 
major building block for knowledge structures such as mental models (Walsh, 1995), 
knowledge about the coexistence of worldviews related to a specific domain (e.g., product 
markets associated with business units) may permeate the organization in a way that 
knowledge about specific experiences in this domain could not. Thereby, the proposed 
generalized effect differs from concepts such as knowledge transfer between units, which 
often suffers from stickiness that impedes the reuse of practices in other subunits (Szulanski, 
1996). Overall, we expect the following:
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Multiplicity of mental models is positively associated with an acquirer’s experi-
ential learning: Acquirers with greater multiplicity of mental models require less cumulative 
cross-border M&A experience to reach the turning point beyond which they attach relatively less 
weight to network- vis-à-vis expertise-related criteria.
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Method
Data and Sample
We retrieved data from the Thomson Reuters’ Financials SDC M&A database (hence-
forth, Thomson). It records all publicly announced M&As worldwide, including details on all 
legal counsels involved in the transactions. Our initial Sample A consists of 153,622 domes-
tic and international M&A attempts announced from 1994 to 2010. We used the available 
information on acquirers and counsels to construct our main variables, whereby our defini-
tions of acquirer and counsel coincide with the variables “acquirer ultimate parent” and 
“legal advisor” in Thomson. We then reduced Sample A to a smaller set for our hypotheses 
tests (domestic M&As, n = 5,594; cross-border M&As, n = 5,917). This Sample B includes 
acquirers and deals (a) that are neither self-tenders nor minority deals, (b) that have at least 
one law firm on board, (c) that have acquirer and target primarily active in the nonfinancial 
nonlegal service industries, (d) where the acquirer attempted at least one M&A in the 4 years 
prior to the focal deal, and (e) where all relevant variables are filled.4
Dependent Variables
For testing H1b and H2b, we generated for each M&A in Sample B the integer variable 
duration of the closing phase. It measures the difference between the dates of initial public 
announcement and unconditional completion for every merger officially consummated before 
January 11, 2015. Because durations range from 1 to 3,213 days, with a median of 53 days, we 
included their natural logarithm, thereby alleviating concerns that the results might be driven 
by a small number of deals with a very long closing phase. However, the correct unit of analy-
sis for testing H1b and H2b is not a merger but an advisor-acquirer dyad. To avoid the statisti-
cal interdependency among the considerable number of M&As in Sample B (34%), where the 
acquirer employed a team of two or more advisors, we focused on the “lead advisor”—that is, 
the largest lawyer in terms of law firm worldwide experience (variable introduced later).5
For testing H1a, H2a, H3, and H4, we constructed for each M&A in Sample B a “risk set” 
of potential legal counsels. Within this set, we examined the probability that a given law firm 
was selected by the focal acquirer, measured as the likelihood of selection, which is 1 for every 
law firm that was appointed (0 otherwise). The risk sets include, next to the actually appointed 
counsels, lawyers who could have been selected. As there are many firms that are obviously 
implausible candidates (e.g., a German lawyer in a U.S.-Japan deal), we constructed sets of 
“shortlisted” candidates, who had counseled in at least one other deal in the year of the focal 
M&A’s announcement and were among the top 5% of firms in terms of at least one of the four 
network- and expertise-based law firm attributes described here. A typical risk set in our anal-
ysis then consists of 104 law firms per deal, on average. Multiplied by the 11,511 deals in 
Sample B, the total risk set (Sample C) comprises 1,160,232 acquirer–law firm dyads.
Independent Variables
Advisor-client relationship. We measured the intensity of the law firm–acquirer relation-
ship by prior interactions between them. For each law firm–acquirer dyad in Samples B and C, 
we counted the number of (prior) advisor-client ties recorded in Thomson, and we interpreted 
this, in line with Gulati (1995), as a measure of interorganizational familiarity. Furthermore, 
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we divided this count measure by the total number of law firms with which an acquirer had 
previously worked to obtain the percentage variable advisor-client tie strength. Following 
network literature (e.g., Jensen, 2003; Mizruchi & Stearns, 2001), this measure serves as an 
indicator of interorganizational trust, as it captures the degree of “exclusivity” of a relation-
ship. As for all law firm–related variables, the data were retrieved from Sample A. We counted 
all matches of the same name pair in the transactions prior to a focal M&A that preceded the 
deal by no more than 4 years. Prior studies on organizational networks often used such a mov-
ing time window (e.g., Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Lee, 2013). For the legal counsel market, it is 
further justified by the high turnover of personnel, especially among the elite of the profession 
(Heinz et al., 2001).
Law firm country-specific expertise. We operationalized country-specific expertise 
by law firm acquirer country expertise and law firm target country expertise (henceforth, 
acquirer country expertise and target country expertise). Each variable counts a firm’s prior 
M&A advisory appointments in the home country of the focal acquirer and the focal target, 
respectively. Using transaction history as an expertise measure has several advantages over 
alternatives—for example, it captures not only knowledge embedded in the firm but also its 
business experience. Uzzi and Lancaster (2004), for example, measured legal expertise of a 
law firm directly by weighting the law school degrees of lawyers in each of a firm’s (foreign) 
offices. Yet, as expertise is rewarded with more offers, the number of past appointments is a 
viable proxy for these more direct dimensions of legal expertise (Lazega, 2001). At the same 
time, it portrays a more accurate picture of the service quality, as the transaction history also 
captures experience and routines developed through actual practice of the law. We calculated 
acquirer and target country expertise as the percentage shares of the total number of a law 
firm’s past appointments in the 4 years prior to a deal. Values of 100% and 0% reflect high 
and low expertise in the legal framework of a country, respectively. In this way, the variables 
capture those elements of service quality that are difficult to transfer across national contexts. 
Only very few large law firms are truly international: Linklaters (United Kingdom) and Clif-
ford Chance (United States), for example, advised foreign clients in 62% and 75% of their 
deals during our sampling period, respectively. The majority of firms, even among the top 
tier, focus almost entirely on a domestic clientele. By controlling for overall transaction his-
tory, this percentage measure thus reflects the high degree of geographic specialization in the 
industry.
Acquirer cross-border M&A experience. Acquirer cross-border M&A experience counts, 
for every acquirer in Sample B, all prior cross-border M&As attempted by the firm in the 4 
years preceding the focal deal. For testing H3, the variable is included in the legal advisor 
selection models, where it interacts with the law firm variables described earlier. As learn-
ing might be nonlinear (e.g., Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999), we also included the square of 
cross-border M&A experience in the selection models.
Acquirers’ multiplicity of mental models. Measuring multiplicity of mental models is 
challenging, especially in large-scale research settings, which allow only for indirect assess-
ment (for direct methods with smaller samples, see, e.g., Kaplan, 2008; Markoczy, 2001). 
Thus, we used several measures that vary along two dimensions. First, for level of analy-
sis, we constructed three measures at the organizational level and one at the level of the 
2206  Journal of Management / May 2019
top management team (TMT). Second, regarding distance from the object of learning, we 
included several corporate domains, ranging from more to less distant from selecting legal 
advisors in M&As.
At the organizational level, we assessed multiplicity of mental models (mmm) first in the 
domain of antitrust systems (e.g., Glendening, Khurana, & Wang, 2016). We classified all 
countries in Sample A according to the Wiki project “Antitrust Around the World” (Hylton & 
Deng, 2007). This Wiki identifies core dimensions of antitrust systems and cardinally ranks 
countries’ current and historic systems in terms of the scrutiny that they exercise in each of 
them. We used the overall antitrust system score. As the overall country scores cluster 
between 17 and 25 points, we grouped countries by score percentiles to obtain a more dis-
criminatory classification. Our theory emphasizes the impact of the simple prevalence of a 
range of distinct mental models, as opposed to trying to weight them according to their fre-
quency or relatedness—as is often done in studies focusing on diversity of experience (e.g., 
Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002; Powell & Rhee, 2016). In contrast to such studies, we there-
fore constructed a simple count measure (mmm antitrust systems) of the number of antitrust 
score percentiles to which an acquirer had been exposed during the 4 years prior to a focal 
deal (similarly, see, e.g., Dahlin et al., 2005).
Second, as M&As are frequently subject to political maneuvering (Serdar Dinc & Erel, 
2013), we measured multiplicity of mental models in the domain of political systems (mmm 
political systems). We classified the countries in Sample A according to the “political stabil-
ity” indicator of the Worldbank Worldwide Governance Indicators database. The index is a 
cardinal number ranging from −2.5 to 2.5 and is available as of 1996. Similar to the mmm 
antitrust systems measure, we counted for each acquirer the number of political systems’ 
score percentiles to which the firm had been exposed in the 4 years prior to the focal deal, 
which means that the variable is available for deals announced from 2000 to 2010. Both these 
measures have the advantage that they depict the focal structural attribute of an organiza-
tion’s mental models (i.e., their multiplicity) in a domain that is closely related to the object 
of learning—that is, selecting legal counsels in cross-border M&As. Yet, for this very reason, 
it is difficult to disentangle their effect from the impact of experience in these domains, in 
terms of volume and diversity. In fact, experience constitutes a major building block of the 
emergence and development of any knowledge structure and thus also a key driver of multi-
plicity of mental models. Therefore, to test H4, we sought to assess mental models in less 
related corporate domains that bear no immediate relation with the selection of legal counsels 
in M&As.
Third, we considered the domain of product markets. Prior research argued that product 
markets or industry sectors are associated with distinct industry-specific shared concepts of 
business conduct (Spender, 1987), which may be associated with distinct mental models (on 
the impact of diversification on the content of managers’ mental models, see, e.g., Ginsberg, 
1989). Various ways exist to assess the degree to which firms have operations in more than 
product markets, such as the Herfindahl index (e.g., Wan, Hoskisson, Short, & Yiu, 2011). 
Again, in line with our theory, we used a simple count of the total number of distinct 4-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes in which an acquirer was active at the time of 
announcing the focal deal. For acquirer and target in every merger, Thomson records all their 
industry activities as measured by SIC codes. Since our unit of analysis is the acquirer’s 
ultimate parent, we aggregated the subsidiary SIC codes and counted, for every ultimate 
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parent in Sample B, the number of unique SIC codes of all affiliations with the parent at the 
time of announcing the focal M&A and in the prior 4 years. The result is the time-varying 
variable acquirer mmm product markets.
Finally, we included a measure of multiplicity related to a firm’s TMT. We measured the 
number of nationalities represented among the top decision makers, divided by the size of 
the TMT. Upper echelon studies (e.g., Bromiley & Rau, 2016; Hambrick, Davidson, Snell, & 
Snow, 1998; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013) and team studies in general (e.g., Dahlin et al., 2005) 
suggested that nationality/national origin may be strongly related to the worldviews of deci-
sion makers and the mental models that they hold (see Marano, Arregle, Hitt, Spadafora, & 
van Essen, 2016; although this view is not uncontested—see, e.g., Markoczy, 1997; for 
details, see Appendix 1, available online). Note that our operationalization differs from the 
way in which upper echelon and team studies usually assessed team composition, often based 
on the Blau index (e.g., Carpenter & Frederickson, 2001; in relation to TMT diversity and 
acquisition learning, see, e.g., Nadolska & Barkema, 2014), as we are interested purely in 
how many distinct mental models are present in a TMT, as opposed to any group dynamics. 
As TMT data are not recorded in Thomson, we collected this information from archival 
sources. This, though, required us to focus on a smaller sample of deals and associated 
acquirers, in line with extant upper echelon studies (e.g., Carpenter & Frederickson, 2001). 
To keep the data collection tractable while maximizing the chances of finding the required 
TMT information, including non-U.S. firms as well, we zoomed in on the year 2010 and on 
the largest 50 acquirers that appeared at least once during that year. Following prior studies 
(e.g., Carpenter & Frederickson, 2001), we operationalized the TMT as the top two tiers of 
management—CEO and members of the executive board (e.g., chief financial officer)—and 
the next-highest management tier, including other senior managers listed as executive offi-
cers. We obtained information from firms’ annual reports, U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission 10-K filings, and, if otherwise not available, company websites and public 
sources, such as directorstats.co.uk. Thereby, we were able to acquire complete information 
for 30 firms involved as acquirers in 65 cross-border M&As from among our sample in 2010.
Control Variables
In terms of lawyer attributes, based on the close link between service quality and market 
rewards (Lazega, 2001), law firm worldwide experience captures general quality differences 
between firms. In a service industry such as the legal sector, it also proxies for firm size. 
Number of advisors controls for the influence of the size of the advisory team (Hunter & 
Jagtiani, 2003). In terms of acquirer attributes, as M&A experience has a direct, potentially 
nonlinear influence on precompletion outcomes (e.g., Dikova et al., 2010), we included an 
acquirer’s cross-border M&A experience and the squared experience as control variables in 
the outcome analyses. For the same reason, we also included the mental model variables and 
acquirer country experience and target country experience in these analyses. We constructed 
the latter variables in the same way as the corresponding law firm variables. Acquirer net-
work size counts the number of law firms with which a bidder has previously worked. With 
advisor-client tie strength, this variable defines an acquirer’s “market interface” (Baker, 
1990) with the legal industry. Public acquirer indicates whether an acquirer is publicly listed 
(1, 0 otherwise), and acquirer size measures the total asset value of an acquirer and its 
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subsidiaries (in U.S. dollars). In terms of transaction attributes, on the basis of prior research 
(e.g., Wong & O’Sullivan, 2001), we included public target (1, 0 otherwise), deal value (in 
U.S. dollars), number of bidders, the percentage variable stock payment measuring the 
acquirer’s intended share of stock payments, and tender offer to identify deals where the 
acquirer approaches the target’s shareholders directly (1, 0 otherwise). We controlled for tim-
ing of a deal by including year dummies. Following La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
(2008), we controlled for regulatory hurdles by adding a common law origin dummy if the 
target country had a common law origin—that is, a more merger-friendly control regime (1, 
0 otherwise; Rossi & Volpin, 2004). Finally, same legal origin indicates acquirer–target 
country pairs with the same legal origin (1, 0 otherwise).
Estimation Techniques
The major issue with our simultaneous estimation of selection criteria and outcomes is 
that the law firms in Sample B are not randomly allocated to deals. Instead, they are selected 
by the decision of an acquirer who chooses, as hypothesized, only the most suitable candi-
dates from Sample C. This may confound the true effect of a law firm’s network- and exper-
tise-based attributes in the outcome analysis (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). Even though this 
problem is partially alleviated by including various control variables, which together account 
for the likely fact that a more difficult case calls for a more competent lawyer, several dimen-
sions of transaction complexity that we do not observe are likely to remain. To account for 
these unobserved dimensions, we estimated Heckman two-stage models (Heckman, 1979), 
with likelihood of selection as the dependent variable in the first stage of our regression and 
duration of the closing phase in the second. These models require some regressors in the 
selection equation that are not included in the outcome equation, but none of the aforemen-
tioned variables qualifies as such an exclusion restriction, as we constructed all of them 
based on the assumption that they might affect outcomes. We therefore followed recent 
research in financial economics (e.g., Acharya, Davydenko, & Strebulaev, 2012) and gener-
ated several auxiliary interaction terms from the available law firm variables that capture the 
notion of “herd behavior”: An acquirer is likely to put more weight on an attribute as a selec-
tion criterion if other acquirers rely on the same criterion. We opted for law firm worldwide 
experience, interacted it with the variable’s average among all lawyers appointed as legal 
counsel in the same country and same year as the focal deal, and included the resulting inter-
action term in the selection equations.
Results
Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents means, SDs, and Pearson correlation coefficients of all variables in 
Sample B (see Appendix 2 for the corresponding table of the larger Sample C). As the vari-
able range of many count measures is substantial and their means and medians are compara-
tively small, we computed the natural logarithms to ensure that our regression results are not 
driven by a few firms with very large counts. Correlations between the mmm variables vary 
between –.06 and .78, supporting the notion that they indeed describe knowledge structures 
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(b) acquirer cross-border M&A experience and acquirer size are, with a maximum Pearson 
correlation <.81, in the range of values typical of experiential learning studies (e.g., 
Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002).
Acquirers’ Criteria for Selecting Legal Advisors
Table 2 presents the results of testing H1a and H2a. Models 1 and 2 investigate the selec-
tion criteria that acquirers apply in their choice of a legal counsel for domestic and cross-
border deals, respectively.
H1a suggested that an advisor would more likely be selected for a domestic deal if it had 
more country expertise and closer connections with the acquirer. Indeed, advisor-client ties, 
advisor-client tie strength, and acquirer country expertise are all significant and positive in 
Model 1. We also posited that network-related criteria would have a stronger impact on selec-
tion. As advisor-client tie strength and acquirer country expertise are measured in percentage 
points, we tested this formally by comparing their unweighted effect sizes. In particular, as 
suggested by Wiersema and Bowen (2009), we compared their marginal effects. The results 
showed that advisor-client tie strength alone is a more important selection criterion than 
acquirer country expertise over the entire range of observations—that is, acquirer–law firm 
dyads in Sample C (p < .021). Thus, H1a is supported. H2a suggested that acquirers would 
transfer selection rules from domestic to cross-border M&As using basically the same rela-
tive weight of criteria, with prior ties being predominant. In Model 2, the coefficients of all 
four law firm attributes are significant and similar in size to the ones of Model 1. Also, a test 
on the relative size of marginal effects of advisor-client tie strength versus the country exper-
tise variables shows that even tie strength alone is more important for selection than the two 
expertise-related variables together (p < .001). H2a is therefore supported.
Determinants of Precompletion Outcomes
First, we check the degree to which (a) sample selection is an issue and (b) our exclusion 
restriction is a valid instrument. Our exclusion restriction, the “herd variable,” is included in 
the selection equations in Models 1 and 2 (Table 2). The coefficient is highly significant (p < 
.001), suggesting that acquirers indeed seem to follow other acquirers in their selection crite-
ria, supporting our case of a valid instrument. The final lines of Models 7 to 10 (Table 3) 
present the coefficients of the inverse Mills ratio constructed from the selection equations 
and included in the corresponding outcome equations. The ratio is significant only in the 
control variable specification for domestic deals (Model 7, p = .002). It is insignificant in all 
other models (p > .438), suggesting that sample selection is not a major issue for the analysis, 
particularly not for the cross-border models. Because Heckman selection models are prone to 
produce inefficiently high standard errors, Models 8 to 10 present, as recommended (Cameron 
& Trivedi, 2005: 552), coefficients and p values of a standard ordinary least squares 
regression.
H1b predicted that a lawyer’s country-specific expertise and strength of links with the 
acquirer would reduce closing time in domestic M&As. According to Model 9, only advisor-
client tie strength has the hypothesized negative effect (p < .001). Acquirer country expertise 
has the predicted sign but is insignificant; advisor-client ties has no meaningful effect. We 
also hypothesized that prior relations would contribute relatively more to completion than 
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Table 2
Results of the Selection Models




















Mental model second-order interactions
 Mental model 
variable ×
 
 Experiential learning 
interaction 3 (MM1)
H4: − −.02 (.072) −.01 (.317) −.10 (.000)
 Experiential learning 
interaction 4 (MM2)
H4: + .01 (.002) .01 (.000) −.01 (.529)
Experiential learning interactions




 Advisor-client tie 
strength (EL1)
H3: + .31 (.002) .21 (.059) .20 (.059) .10 (.388)
 Law firm target ctr. 
experience (EL2)





 Advisor-client tie 
strength (EL3)
H3: − −.07 (.121) .04 (.565) .14 (.821) .26 (.000)
 Law firm target country 
experience (EL4)
H3: + .03 (.025) −.03(.170) −.03 (.052) .01 (.452)
Exclusion restriction
 Law firm worldwide 
experience (log) ×
 
 Average law firm 
experience in same 
country-year
+ .01 (.000) .01 (.000) .01 (.000) .01 (.000) .01 (.000) .01 (.000)
Law firm variables
 Advisor-client ties H1: + .06 (.000) .09 (.000) .09 (.000) .09 (.000) .09 (.000) .10 (.000)
 Advisor-client tie 
strength
H1: + 2.08 (.000) 2.02 (.000) 1.90 (.000) 1.90 (.000) 1.90 (.000) 1.88 (.000)
 Acquirer country 
expertise
H1: + .77 (.000) .20 (.000) .20 (.000) .20 (.000) .21 (.000) .20 (.000)
 Target country 
expertise
H1: + — .66 (.000) .66 (.000) .65 (.000) .64 (.000) .65 (.000)
 Worldwide 
experience (log)
+ 32 (.000) .21 (.000) .20 (.000) .21 (.000) .20 (.000) .21 (.000)
 No. of advisors + .20 (.000) .17 (.000) .17 (.000) .17 (.000) .17 (.000) .17 (.000)
Acquirer variables
 Cross-border M&A 
experience (log)
− .09 (.000) .02 (.031) .02 (.200) .02 (.193) .02 (.173) .02 (.347)
 (Cross-border M&A 
experience [log])2
− −.03 (.000) −.02 (.000) .02 (.001) −.01 (.004) −.01 (.001) −.02 (.002)
 Network size (log) ? −.10 (.000) −.02 (.006) −.02 (.017) −.02 (.015) −.02 (.009) −.02 (.014)
 Home country 
experience
− −.17 (.000) −.04 (.023) −.04 (.024) −.04 (.022) −.04 (.034) −.05 (.012)
(continued)
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 Target country 
experience
− — −.16 (.000) −.16 (.000) −.16 (.000) −.15 (.000) −.16 (.000)
 Acquirer mmm 
antitrust systems
− — −.01 (.398) −.01 (.455) −.01 (.149) — —
 Acquirer mmm 
political systems
− — — — — −.01 (.866) —
 Acquirer mmm product 
markets (log)
− — — — — — .02 (.226)
 Acquirer size (log) ? −.01 (.475) .01 (.357) .01 (.376) .01 (.325) −.01 (.307) −.00 (.689)
 Public acquirer ? .01 (.319) −.01 (.609) −.01 (.555) −.01 (.587) −.01 (.780) −.01 (.348)
Announced mergers 
(Sample B), n
5,594 5,917 5,917 5,917 5,680 5,917
Law firm–merger dyads 
(Sample C) , n
524,506 634,669 634,669 634,669 613,482 634,669
Note: The table reports point estimates and p values in parentheses. All models include a constant, 7 merger control variables 
introduced in the Method section, and 12 year dummies (not reported). Models 4–6 omit two potential interaction terms between 
the multiplicity of mental model variables and the “linear” experience interactions, EL1 and EL2. The omission has solely a 
statistical reason, since these “linear” interaction terms are highly correlated with MM1 and MM2 (Pearson correlation >.95). 
Nevertheless, from a logical viewpoint, either set of interaction terms is sufficient to test H4 because both shift the turning point 
of the experiential learning parabola. The question still is whether our findings are robust to that choice. In online appendix 8, 
Table A8, we successfully reproduce the results presented here using the alternative set of mental model interaction terms. M&A 
= merger and acquisition; mmm = multiplicity of mental models.
Table 2 (continued)
country expertise. This is confirmed in a Wald test on the relative strength of advisor-client 
tie strength against acquirer country expertise (p = .016). Thus, H1b is supported for the 
effect of advisor-client tie strength. H2b predicted a significant role of expertise and prior ties 
for the completion of cross-border deals but, in contrast to H1b, with country expertise as the 
predominant factor. The first part of H2b is partly supported, and the second part is fully sup-
ported: Only acquirer country expertise and target country expertise have the predicted neg-
ative effects on duration, whereby the latter shows a stronger effect (Model 10). The two 
relational variables are insignificant. A Wald test on the relative strength of target country 
expertise versus advisor-client tie strength shows that the difference in effect sizes is statisti-
cally significant (p = .008). H2b is supported, especially for a counsel’s target country exper-
tise in cross-border deals.
In terms of economic impact, raising target country expertise from the average value of 
0.21 in Sample C to the maximum of 1.0 reduces the closing phase of an international deal 
by 21%. At an average duration of 80 days, this corresponds to a reduction of ~17 days. The 
effect of advisor-client tie strength in domestic deals is equally sizable: Duration decreases 
by 26% or 21 days. Both effects are in the range of values found for established determinants 
of precompletion outcomes (Wong & O’Sullivan, 2001). They are larger than, for example, 
the difference between a private offer and a tender offer for an attempted cross-border deal 
(15 days), and they almost match the difference between an all-cash deal and a stock-financed 
deal (26 days).
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Table 3
Results of the Outcome Models
















Law firm variables  
 Advisor-client ties H2: − .01 (.065) .01 (.530)
 Advisor-client tie strength H2: − −.36 (.000) .01 (.889)
 Acquirer country expertise H2: − −.05 (.512) −.21 (.018)
 Target country expertise H2: − — −.33 (.000)
 Worldwide experience (log) − .02 (.311) .04 (.038) −.02 (.323) .02 (.369)
 No. of advisors + −.01 (.885) .03 (.138) .01 (.998) .02 (.271)
Acquirer variables  
 Cross-border M&A experience 
(log)
− −.05 (.371) −.02 (.734) −.07 (.240) −.03 (.603)
 (Cross-border M&A experience 
[log])2
− .01 (.699) −.02 (.399) .01 (.594) −.02 (.380)
 Network size (log) − .02 (.579) −.01 (.975) .01 (.843) .02 (.698)
 Home country experience − −.03 (.767) −.14 (.148) −.03 (.718) −.10 (.282)
 Target country experience − — .02 (.826) — .05 (.660)
 Acquirer mmm antitrust systems ? — −.03 (.209) — −.03 (.194)
 Acquirer size (log) + .03 (.022) .07 (.000) .03 (.036) .07 (.000)
 Public acquirer + .14 (.013) .13 (.040) .15 (.011) .13 (.037)
Merger variables  
 Deal value (log) + .39 (.000) .41 (.000) .39 (.000) .41 (.000)
 No. of bidders + .05 (.708) .01 (.934) .06 (.614) .02 (.909)
 Public target + 1.08 (.000) .81 (.000) 1.08 (.000) .80 (.000)
 Stock payment + .39 (.000) .38 (.000) .39 (.000) .38 (.000)
 Tender offer + .02 (.814) .20 (.035) .02 (.817) .20 (.033)
 Common law target country − −.10 (.138) −.11 (.045) −.10 (.156) −.01 (.977)
 Same legal origin − — −.03 (.544) — −.05 (.276)
Announced mergers (Sample B), n 5,594 5,917 5,594 5,917
Law firm–merger dyads (Sample 
C), n
524,506 634,669 524,506 634,669
Inverse Mills ratio .13 (.001) .04 (.383) .49 (.124) −.33 (.536)
Note: The table reports point estimates and p values in parentheses. The p values of the inverse Mills ratio stem 
from a Wald test for independence of the outcome equations (Models 7–10) from the corresponding selection 
equations (Models 1 and 2). H0: Coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio = 0. The H0 is not rejected for Models 8–10. 
Thus, as Heckman selection models produce inefficiently high standard errors, we present, as recommended by 
Cameron and Trivedi (2005: 552), the coefficients and p values of a standard OLS regression. All models include a 
constant and year dummies (not reported).  M&A = merger and acquisition; mmm = multiplicity of mental models; 
OLS = ordinary least squares.
Testing for Learning and the Impact of an Acquirer’s Multiplicity of Mental 
Models
H3 postulated that the discrepancy between selection criteria and drivers of law firm perfor-
mance in cross-border deals would be curvilinear in bidders’ cross-border M&A experience, 
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with a turning point beyond which acquirers would predominantly consider country expertise 
in their selection. This curvilinear effect is tested in Model 3 (Table 2) by means of four interac-
tion terms between acquirer cross-border M&A experience, the square of experience, and the 
two key variables of our outcome models: advisor-client tie strength and target country exper-
tise. If such a curvilinear effect were to exist, we would expect that the moderating effect of 
bidder’s cross-border M&A experience on advisor-client tie strength as a selection criterion 
(EL1) was significantly larger than the moderating effect of bidder’s experience on target coun-
try expertise (EL2). Also, we would expect the moderating effect of the square of bidder experi-
ence on advisor-client tie strength (EL3) to be lower than the moderating effect of the square of 
experience on target country expertise (EL4). Both conjectures are supported (Table 2). They 
can, moreover, be corroborated in a comparison of the true moderating effects, as recommended 
by Wiersema and Bowen (2009): In >99% of our acquirer-lawyer dyads, the moderating effects 
(ME) of experience are statistically significant (p < .05 across both comparisons) and satisfy as 
predicted in H3: ME(EL1) – ME(EL2) > 0 and ME(EL3) – ME(EL4) < 0. Hence, with suffi-
cient experience, acquirers may overcome the initial bias in their international selection deci-
sions. Another question is whether the typical acquirer will ever accumulate enough experience 
to reach the turning point. The corresponding marginal effects plot shows that a transaction 
history of at least 13 cross-border deals is necessary to reach this point (see Appendix 4, Figure 
A1). This is the privilege of 12.5% of the most frequent acquirers: For the majority of firms in 
our sample, experience alone is thus insufficient.
Models 4 to 6 (Table 2) test whether bidders with a greater number of mental models reach 
the turning point earlier, requiring less experience (H4). The results largely support this 
hypothesis. First, the positive difference between the linear parts of the experiential learning 
interactions, EL1 and EL2, prevails in Models 4 to 6, suggesting that at low levels of experi-
ence, acquirers lean increasingly more on advisor-client tie strength for selection. At high 
levels of experience, acquirers in turn put more weight on target country expertise for selec-
tion, especially if they also exhibit greater multiplicity of mental models. This is suggested 
by the positive difference between the coefficients on the mental model interaction terms 
(MM2 − MM1 > 0 in all three models). To confirm this formally, we also computed the true 
second-order moderating effects (2ME) of our mmm variables. As the code is not by default 
implemented in the statistical software package, we predicted the moderating effects manu-
ally according to the STATA source code printed in the appendix of Wiersema and Bowens 
(2009: 690). Appendix 5 presents our code and Table A4 an overview of the results. Appendix 
8 presents additional robustness checks. To summarize, the moderating effects of all three 
mmm variables satisfy, as predicted in H4: 2ME (MM1) – 2ME(MM2) < 0 for at least 90% 
of the acquirer-law firm dyads in Sample C. Thus, the turning point seems contingent on an 
acquirer’s multiplicity of mental models—that is, multiplicity shifts down the critical num-
ber of M&As required before an acquirer puts more weight on a lawyer’s target country 
expertise. The marginal effects plots of Figure 1 illustrate this, too: The typical bidder with 
low multiplicity never reaches the turning point, regardless of the amount of experience that 
it accumulates, as observed in our data. In contrast, almost all acquirers with a high level of 
multiplicity reach the turning point (see Table A5 in Appendix 6 for details). Finally, we 
assessed H4 in a subsample of deals announced in 2010. We computed correlations between 
the number of TMT nationalities of the acquirers and attributes of their counsels (see also 
Appendix 7, Table A6). In support of H4, TMT nationalities is positively correlated with—
and only with—target country expertise (Pearson correlation = .29, p < .001).
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Figure 1
Role of Tie Strength and Country Expertise as a Selection Criterion at Different 
Levels of M&A Experience and Multiplicity of Mental Models
The panels present effect (advisor-client tie strength) – marginal effect (law firm target country expertise) on the 
likelihood of selection at different levels of acquirer cross-border M&A experience and multiplicity of mental models 
(mmm). Marginal effects stem from Models 4 to 6 (Table 2) and are illustrated by quadratic prediction plots. The values 
for the mmm variables are chosen to highlight the emergence and inward shift of the turning point. The bottom panel, 
for example, shows that no turning point is in reach for acquirers in the bottom 50% of mmm product markets. A turning 
point emerges for acquirers in the sixth decile and is shifted to the left in the eighth decile. M&A = merger and acquisition.
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Discussion
In the context of acquirers’ selection of legal advisors in M&As, this study first examined 
whether firms transfer specific routines and rules from one context (domestic) to another 
(cross-border); furthermore, we analyzed whether such a transfer might result in an initially 
suboptimal match, in terms of legal counsels’ performance, between the transferred routines 
and the novel context. On this basis, the study investigated whether accumulation of M&A 
experience would allow acquirers to overcome any such mismatch by revising their selection 
criteria in cross-border deals. Such rebalancing, we argued, would require a categorical 
reversal of the relative importance attached to the two types of law firm attributes studied—
country expertise vis-à-vis network relations. We suggested that acquirers’ experiential learn-
ing would need to involve a shift from lower-level learning, which occurs within a given set 
of rules (Fiol & Lyles, 1985), to higher-level learning that would entail adjusting these rules 
themselves. Finally, this study examined whether acquirers featuring a greater number of 
distinct mental models would enjoy advantages in terms of a specific aspect of their organi-
zational learning—that is, their ability to recognize earlier the need to switch to higher-level 
learning.
The empirical results of this study indicate that selecting lawyers for domestic and inter-
national mergers indeed calls for distinct selection rules: In domestic deals, bidders predomi-
nantly select their legal counsels on the basis of prior network relations, which also dominate 
as determinants of lawyers’ performance toward shortening time to completion. In cross-
border deals, acquirers tend to rely as well (at least initially) on lawyers with whom they 
share prior business relationships. Yet, these law firms are less likely to be experts in the 
specific target country environment. In line with extant social network studies, we thus find 
evidence in this novel empirical context of a dark side of embeddedness; that is, acquirers (at 
least initially) pay insufficient attention to better-matching partners outside their network. 
Acquirers appear to learn, though, when they accumulate M&A experience. After counter-
productive lower-level learning at first, they reach a turning point, after a large number of 
deals, at which they categorically reverse the relative weights of network and expertise crite-
ria. Finally, acquirers with a greater number of mental models needed less experience before 
reaching this turning point. Overall, we believe that our results have important implications 
for theory and practice.
Organizational Learning Research
First, conceptually and empirically, this study builds on and extends research into compo-
nents of the organizational context that are conducive to organizational learning (e.g., Argote, 
2012; Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011; Fiol & Lyles, 1985). For example, it adds to research on 
organizational learning by investigating multiplicity of mental models as a complementary 
facilitator of a specific aspect of firms’ experiential learning: the ability to recognize the need 
to switch from lower- to higher-level learning. The ability to identify when to engage in which 
type of learning was highlighted by Fiol and Lyles (1985) as an important element of organi-
zations’ learning. To the extent that it is closely related to reflection on the underlying learning 
processes itself, our results speak to studies that attempt to establish foundations for a third 
type of learning, such as “metalearning” (Visser, 2007), drawing on Argyris and Schön (1996; 
for overviews, see Visser, 2007; Tosey et al., 2012). The shift from lower- to higher-level 
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learning that is central to this study adds an outcome-oriented element to this concept. By 
empirically documenting such a shift and identifying factors conducive to it, we also contrib-
ute empirically to this literature, which is largely conceptual in nature or rests on anecdotal 
evidence. Furthermore, with respect to H4, the notion that a firm’s level of diversification 
might be related to “skills for higher-level learning” (Fiol & Lyles, 1985: 811) has been voiced, 
although the specific mechanisms that could give rise to such an association have not been 
explicitly spelled out (e.g., Fiol & Lyles, 1985; related, Miller, 1996). For example, Fiol and 
Lyles (1985: 811) concluded their conceptual study with questions for future research, with 
one being whether “diversified firms have better skills for higher-level learning than do single 
business firms.” Conceptually, we propose a possible mechanism—multiplicity of mental 
models—that could give rise to such an effect and empirically test the resulting prediction for 
a specific aspect of learning: recognition of the need to shift to higher-level learning.
Our findings may also hold value for research at the interface of organizational learning 
and diversification (e.g., Duysters et al., 2012; Pennings, Barkema, & Douma, 1994). 
While the dominant view in the literature on diversification is skeptical regarding its impli-
cations for firm value (e.g., Lang & Stulz 1994; Wan et al., 2011), recent studies cautiously 
pointed to potential yet contingent benefits of diversification—for some firms, in certain 
contexts, and in relation to specific tasks (e.g., Mackey, Barney, & Dotson, 2017; Tate & 
Yang, 2015). Our results add a specific aspect of learning to the list of corporate activities 
that could be positively affected by diversification, including a possible mechanism under-
lying this effect.
Social Network Research
This study adds to social network studies by focusing on how experiential learning may 
provide a safeguard against the “dark side” of strong network ties that may lead organizations 
to pay insufficient attention to better-matching partners outside their network (e.g., Lee, 
2013; Mitsuhashi & Min, 2016). Our results support this view by documenting the contin-
gent value of network relationships in a novel empirical context (e.g., Gulati, 1995; Yang, 
Lin, & Peng, 2011). In addition, we show that firms appear to face significant difficulties in 
overcoming the risks of overembeddedness, as they need to accumulate substantial experi-
ence before starting to pay due attention to local experts outside their networks. Factors such 
as causal ambiguity and infrequency of experiences complicate organizational learning in 
complex corporate domains (Argote, 2012). In the present context, a complementary influ-
ence may impede bidders’ learning: strategic behavior of familiar partners. Past ties may 
become a source of opportunistic exploitation, as the creation and presence of trust generate 
precisely those conditions under which fraudulent behavior yields the highest payoffs 
(Granovetter, 1985). As familiar counsels gain from exclusive relationships, they might, stra-
tegically or unintentionally, obstruct acquirers’ learning by striving to exclude more compe-
tent (local) experts from the counseling team.
M&A Research
This study adds to literature on M&A completion (e.g., Chakrabarti & Mitchell, 2016; 
Dikova et al., 2010; Muehlfeld et al., 2012; Zhou et al., 2016) by pointing to legal advisors 
as a complementary influence. The explanatory power of the results, as compared with prior 
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studies, implies that this type of factor—external advisors whose relevance likely varies, 
depending on the specific merger phase—is important to include in future studies.
Implications for Practice
First, the results shed light on the value of experience for learning how to overcome the 
dark side of embeddedness. They suggest that learning might be impeded by external parties 
who strive to exclude competent (local) experts from their alliances for strategic reasons—
and acquirers should be aware of this. Second, positive effects for organizational learning 
may result from the presence of a range of mental models available in an organization. These 
findings thus point to a similar direction as other studies, such as Tate and Yang (2015), who 
argued that firms may reap productivity benefits by redeploying labor internally to alterna-
tive uses—a type of human capital investment that likely contributes to the diffusion of 
knowledge about multiplicity of mental models throughout the organization. In a similar 
vein, Powell and Rhee (2016) emphasized, among other factors, the value of variance, though 
in experience, attributed to the greater caution with which decision makers interpret past 
experience. Embracing a healthy dose of skepticism regarding the generalizability of an 
organization’s experience and keeping an open mind for alternative worldviews may enable 
firms to more easily engage in rule-changing higher-order learning, if needed.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
As any study, this one has its limitations, which can be addressed in future research. A first 
relates to internal validity. Future research might complement our dependent variable with 
other measures, such as completion time with search time (related, Uzzi & Lancaster, 2004). 
Yet, the relevance of different types of external advisors (e.g., lawyers, investment banks; see 
Hayward, 2003) varies across the M&A process. Outcome variables and the scope of influ-
ence of the type of advisor should be aligned. For example, while legal advisors affect the 
speed of closing, they are not usually heavily involved in bargaining about premiums. 
Regardless, future research should probe whether our conclusions extend to other combina-
tions of advisor-outcome variables. A second limitation pertains to our measures of organiza-
tional learning and multiplicity of mental models, neither of which is directly observed. It is 
standard procedure in much of the learning literature to use counts of cumulative experience 
as input measures (for an overview, Argote, 2012). Still, future research should probe the 
robustness of our results through alternative measures and settings, as our data do not allow 
us to unambiguously identify the factors that drive (a) the initial discrepancy between selec-
tion criteria and antecedents of lawyers’ performance in international deals and (b) the 
sluggishness of acquirers’ adaptation. Consequently, we cannot fully rule out alternative 
explanations: For example, even if a familiar advisor cannot provide the same high service 
quality as a local expert, the long-term advisor might charge lower fees (Uzzi & Lancaster, 
2004) or be more trustworthy in terms of the variability of outcomes (cf. Baum et al., 2005).
Furthermore, operationalizing multiplicity of mental models and disentangling the time 
and cross-sectional dimensions—that is, addressing potential overlaps in the effects of expe-
rience and mental models—remains a challenge, not least because experience constitutes a 
key element of the emergence and development of knowledge structures (Walsh, 1995). By 
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using different indicators across several organizational domains and levels, we sought to 
alleviate such concerns. Yet, we acknowledge the difficulty of appropriately operationalizing 
multiplicity of mental models, given the aggregate and indirect nature of our data. While we 
have done our best to control for experience, our proxies for multiplicity of mental models 
may still be intertwined with experience. Therefore, our empirical results should be inter-
preted as being indicative of our theory at best. Future research could consider alternative 
proxies and, through smaller samples, employ other research designs (e.g., in-depth qualita-
tive studies; Kaplan, 2008) and methods (e.g., causal mapping; Markoczy, 2001) that were 
developed for the elicitation and quantification of knowledge structures. Such an approach 
would allow for incorporating the microfoundations of organizational cognition—that is, the 
social dynamics that influence the development of shared cognition within organizations 
(e.g., Kaplan, 2008; Markoczy, 2001), a dimension that is absent from this study. Follow-up 
research could then add valuable insights by offering a multilevel perspective (cf. Eggers & 
Kaplan, 2013). For example, interorganizational differences at the microlevel in the degree 
and way that managers come to hold congruent mental models might translate into distinct 
levels of the proposed generalized awareness effect, despite the same number of mental mod-
els as assessed here, thus accounting for some of the remaining variation in our data. Finally, 
future research could consider, via performance feedback (Greve, 2003), how a lawyer’s 
performance, relative to the acquirer’s aspiration level, interacts with or is influenced by 
multiplicity of mental models. Although our data did not allow us to pursue such questions, 
they emanate from this study, and we hope that they will foster scholarly conversation on 
organizational learning in complex corporate domains.
Notes
1. First, the public announcement presupposes that fundamental issues, such as strategic fit, have mostly been 
resolved (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). Second, announcing a deal entails the revelation of private information 
about a bidder’s strategy (Officer, 2003) and disruption of organizational routines (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986) and 
puts reputations on the line (Luo, 2005). Third, Karsten et al. (2014) emphasized agency concerns: Acquirers may 
prefer a fast closing, as sellers retain control until official consummation, allowing them to extract private benefits.
2. Various factors may trigger a switch between levels of learning: first, factors external to the learning process, 
such as crises (e.g., Fiol & Lyles, 1985); second, factors inherent to the learning process, such as experience (e.g., 
Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). Third, performance feedback theory emphasizes their joint influence by focusing on 
how performance is interpreted relative to historical levels and to social aspiration levels (e.g., Greve, 2003), predict-
ing the existence of a performance threshold beyond which organizations engage in distant rather than local search.
3. Thus, we assume a substantial degree of collectivity among these group mental models, as opposed to inves-
tigating the dynamic and interactive social processes that influence the development of shared cognition within 
organizations (e.g., Kaplan, 2008, 2011; Markoczy, 1997, 2001).
4. To improve data quality and validity of results, we manually corrected for typos in lawyer names and country 
affiliations (by checking the websites), accounted for mergers in the industry, and removed undisclosed acquirers 
and acquirers representing nations or investor groups.
5. As alternatives to focusing on the largest advisor, we (a) analyzed only single-advised deals and (b) repro-
duced the analysis at the advisor team level by calculating the law firm–related variables on the basis of averages and 
maxima of the counsels’ attributes, respectively. Results (available upon request) remained qualitatively unchanged.
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